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Abstract
We determine the optimal policy to cope with information concealment in a hierarchy
where a principal relies on a supervisor to obtain veriﬁable information about an agent’s
output. Depending on the information he has obtained, the informed supervisor may either
collude with the agent or with the principal and conceal information. The principal has the
choice of four policies to cope with information concealment: it can prevent both types of
information concealment, allow both of them, or prevent one of them and allow the other one.
We characterize the incentive contracts in this environment and show that it is not optimal to
allow information concealment, that is, the optimal policy of a hierarchy exposed to multiple
types of information concealment is to prevent them all.
JEL Classification : D20; D73; L20; M50.
Keywords : Hierarchy; Information concealment.
Résumé
Cet article détermine la politique optimale pour gérer la possibilité de la rétention d’infor-
mations dans une ﬁrme hiérarchique à l’intérieur de laquelle un principal emploie un super-
viseur pour être informé sur la performance de son agent. La ﬁrme hiérarchique est vulnérable
à la rétention d’informations par une coalition principal/superviseur ainsi qu’une coalition
superviseur/agent. Pour gérer la possibilité de la rétention d’informations, la ﬁrme a le choix
entre une politique totalement préventive, une politique partiellement préventive/permissive
et une politique totalement permissive. Je montre que la politique optimale d’une ﬁrme hiérar-
chique vulnérable à de multiples formes de rétention d’informations est la prévention totale
ou, de manière équivalente, qu’il n’est pas optimal de tolérer la rétention d’informations à
l’intérieur de la ﬁrme.
Mots-clés : Hiérarchie ; Rétention d’informations.
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1 Introduction
While fair and transparent information dissemination is crucial for the functioning of ﬁrms, infor-
mation concealment in ﬁrms is a well-documented phenomenon.1 An important question for social
scientists is thus: what is the optimal policy to cope with information concealment in hierarchical
ﬁrms? This paper aims at providing an answer to this question.
Opportunities for information concealment arise when a principal relies on a supervisor to
obtain information about an agent’s performance. Depending on the information he has obtained,
the informed supervisor may either collude with the agent or with the principal, and hence conceal
information. Following the seminal work of Tirole (1986), an extensive literature has been devoted
to the analysis of collusion between the supervisor and the agent.2 A central result of this literature
is that it is optimal to deter supervisor/agent collusion, and therefore to prevent information
concealment associated with this type of collusion. The principal may optimally restrict attention
to contracts that do not leave scope for collusion between the supervisor and the agent. This result
is known as the collusion-proofness principle.
While a supervisor’s benevolence for her/his subordinate may result in supervisor/agent col-
lusion, empirical studies show that a supervisor’s loyalty to her/his principal may also result in
principal/supervisor collusion, and hence in an unfair treatment of the supervisor’s subordinate
(e.g., Crozier, 1967; Crozier and Friedberg, 1980). To date, almost nothing is known about this
latter type of collusion. This is because, in order to investigate supervisor/agent collusion, the
focus of the prevailing literature has been speciﬁc models of hierarchies where principal/supervisor
collusion is either artiﬁcially ruled out or harmless.
We depart from the existing literature by considering a more general environment where both
1For example, Crozier (1967), Crozier and Friedberg (1980), Johnson and Libecap (1989), Lev (2003),
Lee, Lev and Yeo (2007), Zhou (2010), Wagner (2011), among others.
2For non-exhaustive surveys and discussions of this literature, see Tirole (1992, 1994). While econo-
mists have investigated other forms of unoﬃcial activity in vertical agency/business relationships, such
as inﬂuence activities (Milgrom, 1988), managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), and abuse
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types of collusion may occur. The principal’s concern is then to design optimal contracts in
a hierarchical organization exposed to multiple types of collusion, or, equivalently, to multiple
types of information concealment. We characterize the diﬀerent possible contractual responses to
collusion and show that the optimal policy is to deter both types of collusion. We therefore provide
a general result for the management of information in hierarchies.
For our analysis, we consider a hierarchical principal-supervisor-agent organization with moral
hazard where the role of the supervisor is to make a veriﬁable report on the agent’s output. The
supervision technology is imperfect, and thus the supervisor obtains information only with a certain
probability. The informed supervisor then has the possibility to conceal information and claim that
supervision has not been conclusive.3 If supervision reveals that the agent has produced a high
output, that is, if the information obtained by the supervisor is unfavorable to the principal - in
the sense that the principal has then to pay a higher wage to the agent than in the case where
supervision is inconclusive - the supervisor may collude with the principal and, in exchange for a
bribe, make an uninformative report. If instead supervision reveals evidence that a low output has
been produced, that is, if the information obtained by the supervisor is unfavorable to the agent,
the supervisor may collude with the agent and, in exchange for a bribe, report that supervision
has not been conclusive.
The principal has the choice of four policies to cope with collusion: it can deter both types
of collusion, allow both of them, or deter one of them and allow the other one. Comparing the
expected costs of these policies, we ﬁnd that the optimal policy to cope with multiple types of
collusion is to prevent them all. We thus establish a multi-collusion-proofness principle.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 investigates
the four possible policies to cope with collusion/information concealment. The optimal policy of
a hierarchy exposed to multiple types of collusion is determined in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the paper. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
3Because it is hard evidence, the supervisor’s information can only be concealed but not forged.
3
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2 The model
A hierarchical agency under moral hazard is composed of three players: a principal (P, it), a
supervisor (S, he) and an agent (A, she).
The agent, who is the productive unit, can choose between two eﬀort levels, e ∈ {0, 1}; i.e.,
she may either shirk (e = 0) or work (e = 1). Neither the principal nor the supervisor can observe
the agent’s eﬀort level. The production technology is such that if the agent decides to work, she
produces a high output xH > 0 with probability π ∈ (0, 1] and a low output xL ≡ 0 with probability
1− π. If instead the agent decides to shirk, she produces xL.
Following the literature on collusion, we assume that hard information, or equivalently, hard
evidence (i.e., veriﬁable), about the output produced by the agent can only be obtained through
supervision (see Tirole, 1992, and references therein). The principal and the agent are unable - due,
for example, to a lack of time or expertise - to perform the supervisory task. The principal thus
relies on the supervisor to obtain a veriﬁable report on the agent’s output. Evidence on output
obtained by the supervisor is his private information, but, once publicly revealed it is veriﬁable.4
Given that the supervision technology is imperfect, the supervisor obtains information about output
only with probability p ∈ (0, 1). The supervisor’s report, r, therefore belongs to I = {xL, ∅, xH},
where r = ∅ indicates that no information has been obtained. Since the information obtained by
the supervisor is hard/veriﬁable evidence, it can be concealed but not forged.5
The agent and the supervisor are both risk neutral and their utility functions are respectively,
UA(w, e) = w−γe and US(s) = s, where w and s are the transfers received from the principal and
γ > 0 is the agent’s disutility of eﬀort. For simplicity and without loss of generality, the agent’s
and supervisor’s reservation utilities are normalized to zero.
4That is, evidence is veriﬁable only by the person(s) to whom the supervisor reveals it. Evidence is
publicly veriﬁable only when the supervisor produces his report.
5This standard assumption means that the supervisor cannot misreport the high output as low output
or the low output as high output. Upon observing the agent’s output, the supervisor can conceal his
information and claim that the monitoring was inconclusive (i.e., r = ∅).
4
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Since hard information about the output is only obtained through supervision, contracts are
contingent on the supervisor’s report. The principal oﬀers a contract (wL, w∅, wH) to the agent,
where wL and wH are the wages she receives when r = xL and r = xH , respectively, and w∅ is
the wage she receives when r = ∅. Similarly, the principal oﬀers a contract (sL, s∅, sH) to the
supervisor. The agent and the supervisor are protected by limited liability. We simply make the
assumption that negative wages cannot be imposed on them.
The high output, xH , is assumed to be large enough for it to be in the principal’s interest to
engage in production.
The principal’s concern is thus to design contracts that both elicit the eﬀort level e = 1 and
minimize the expected cost of production and supervision p [π(wH + sH) + (1− π)(wL + sL)] +
(1− p)(w∅ + s∅).
Given that the supervision technology is imperfect and information is hard, the supervisor has
discretion to conceal information from the principal. The supervisor’s discretion allows him to
engage in two types of collusion. We assume that, when engaging in collusion, the supervisor
unoﬃcially shows the private evidence obtained to the other involved party. That is, in line with
Tirole’s (1986, 1992) standard models and most of the existing literature, collusion occurs under
symmetric information on evidence among involved parties.
When supervision reveals evidence that the agent has produced a low output, the supervisor
may collude with the agent and, in exchange for a bribe, report r = ∅ instead of r = xL to
the principal. The agent then receives w∅ from the principal and pays the promised bribe to the
supervisor. When supervision reveals evidence that a high output has been produced, the principal
may collude with the supervisor. In this case, the supervisor reports r = ∅ instead of r = xH and
the principal pays him the promised bribe.
In accordance with the existing literature, we make the following standard assumptions regard-
ing collusion (see, for example, Tirole, 1992). First, collusion is only observable to the involved
5
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parties. Second, the technology used to transfer bribes, which we refer to as the side transfer
technology, may be less or equally eﬃcient to the oﬃcial transfer technology (i.e., the transfer
technology used by the principal to pay its employees). This means that unoﬃcial income can be
transferred to the supervisor at a rate k ∈ (0, 1]. If k ∈ (0, 1), there are transaction costs connected
to side contracting. That is, a side transfer of size t is only worth kt to the supervisor. This
may be, for example, because collusion is costly to organize. If instead k = 1, the side transfer
technology is totally eﬃcient. Third, the supervisor has all the bargaining power when engaging in
collusion. Fourth, side transfers are enforceable. Fifth, the supervisor does not engage in collusion
when indiﬀerent, that is, when payoﬀs associated with colluding and not colluding are identical.
The timing is as follows: (1) The principal oﬀers a contract (wL, w∅, wH) to the agent and a
contract (sL, s∅, sH) to the supervisor. (2) The agent and the supervisor decide whether to accept
or refuse the contract. If either refuses, the game ends and they both get their reservation utility.
If instead contracts are accepted, the game continues as follows. (3) Supervision takes place and
the agent decides whether to work or to shirk. (4) Hard information about the output produced
by the agent is obtained with probability p and decisions of whether or not to engage in collusion
are made. (5) The supervisor produces a report. (6) Transfers and side transfers take place.
We look for a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game.
3 Policies to cope with information concealment
To cope with information concealment, the principal has the choice of the following four policies:
(1) Deterring both types of collusion (policy 1). (2) Allowing supervisor/agent collusion and
deterring principal/supervisor collusion (policy 2). (3) Deterring supervisor/agent collusion and
allowing principal/supervisor collusion (policy 3). (4) Allowing both types of collusion (policy 4).
In order to determine the optimal policy of a hierarchy regarding collusion, we ﬁrst need to
characterize the optimal contracts and expected cost of each of the above four policies. The optimal
6
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policy is then that which has the lowest expected cost.
3.1 Both types of collusion deterred
When both types of collusion are prevented, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is
p [πwH + (1− π)wL] + (1− p)w∅ − γ ≥ pwL + (1− p)w∅, or equivalently,




This equation makes the agent prefer to exert eﬀort in equilibrium.6
Given that the agent and the supervisor are protected by limited liability,
wL ≥ 0, w∅ ≥ 0, wH ≥ 0, sL≥ 0, s∅≥ 0,sH≥ 0. (2)
The agent’s contract must also satisfy her participation constraint, p [πwH + (1− π)wL]+ (1−
p)w∅ − γ ≥ 0. However, transfers must be nonnegative, and hence the agent’s participation
constraint is redundant and will be disregarded in the rest of the paper.
Collusion between the supervisor and the agent may take place when supervision reveals evi-
dence that a low output has been produced. This is the case either when the agent works hard
but is unlucky or when she shirks. In either case, the supervisor may collude with the agent and,
in exchange for a bribe, report r = ∅ instead of r = xL. If collusion occurs, the agent’s utility is
w∅− bS/A if she has shirked, and w∅− bS/A−γ if she has worked but has been unlucky, where bS/A
is the bribe oﬀered to the supervisor. If instead collusion does not take place, the agent’s utility
is wL if she has shirked, and wL − γ if she has worked but has been unlucky. The agent is then
ready to collude with the supervisor if w∅− bS/A ≥ wL, that is, if bS/A ≤ w∅−wL. The maximum
bribe, bMS/A, the agent is willing to oﬀer for the report, r = ∅, is therefore b
M
S/A ≡ w∅−wL. We have
made the standard assumption that the supervisor does not engage in collusion when indiﬀerent.
Collusion between the supervisor and the agent will thus not take place if the supervisor’s utility
6We make the standard assumption that the agent chooses to work when she is indiﬀerent.
7
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sL ≥ s∅ + k(w∅ − wL). (3)
When supervision reveals evidence that a high output has been produced, the supervisor may
collude with the principal and, in exchange for a bribe, report r = ∅ instead of r = xH . If the
principal does not collude with the supervisor it has to pay wH + sH to its employees whereas if it
colludes with him it only has to payw∅+s∅+bP/S , where bP/S denotes the bribe paid for information
concealment. The principal will thus collude with the supervisor if w∅ + s∅ + bP/S ≤ wH + sH .
The maximum bribe, bMP/S , the principal is then ready to pay for the report r = ∅ is b
M
P/S ≡
wH+sH−w∅−s∅. Principal/supervisor collusion will therefore not occur if the supervisor’s utility




sH ≥ s∅ +
k
1− k
(wH − w∅) for k ∈ (0, 1) or w∅ ≥ wH for k = 1. (4)
We refer to constraints (3) and (4) respectively as the supervisor/agent and the
principal/supervisor no-collusion constraints.
Thus, when both types of collusion are deterred, the program of the hierarchy can be written
as
[P1] min p [π(wH + sH) + (1− π)(wL + sL)] + (1− p)(w∅ + s∅)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (1), (2), (3), and (4).
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Proposition 1 . A hierarchy where both types of collusion are deterred has the following prop-
erties:
(1) The optimal contracts are (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ ) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0,
kγ
(1−k)pπ ) for
k < 1, (a) p ≤ 1− k; (b) p > 1− k and π ≤ π. The expected cost of production and supervision is
C1 = γ1−k .




pπ ) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (
kγ
pπ , 0, 0) for k < 1,
p > 1− k and π > π. The expected cost of production and supervision is C2 = [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γpπ .




pπ ) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (
γ
pπ , 0, 0) for k = 1.
The expected cost of production and supervision is C3 = γpπ .
The principal optimally sets wL = 0, and hence wH =
γ
pπ from the agent’s incentive compati-
bility constraint. To set w∅, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ between reducing the cost of preventing
one type of collusion and increasing the cost of preventing the other type of collusion. The principal
has the choice of two strategies to deter principal/supervisor collusion.
The ﬁrst strategy consists in setting w∅ − wH < 0 - that is, here, in setting w∅ <
γ
pπ and
more precisely w∅ = 0 - and then creating incentive payments for the supervisor, sH , to reveal
his information. We refer to this strategy as incentive strategy. An incentive strategy reduces
the cost, sL, of preventing supervisor/agent collusion but increases the cost, sH , of preventing
principal/supervisor collusion. In fact, the incentive strategy - which, as just stressed, consists
here in setting w∅ = 0 - deters collusion between the supervisor and the agent at no additional
cost, sL, to the principal. Note that throughout the paper we will term incentive strategy a
strategy that deters principal/supervisor collusion by oﬀering w∅ < wH . Hence, two strategies
against principal/supervisor collusion which both set w∅ < wH but involve the use of distinct
contracts may both be termed incentive strategy.




7The terms incentive strategy and stake-eliminating strategy are clearly used with respect to collusion
between the principal and the supervisor.
9
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This strategy destroys the stake, wH − w∅, of principal/supervisor collusion. Unlike the incentive
strategy, the stake-eliminating strategy reduces the cost, sH , of deterring principal/supervisor
collusion but increases the cost, sL, of deterring supervisor/agent collusion. More precisely, as
obvious, the stake-eliminating strategy deters principal/supervisor collusion at no extra cost, sH .
The optimal strategy against collusion will hence depend on the probability of occurrence of
each type of collusion. When it is likely that supervisor/agent collusion takes place, the optimal
strategy is the incentive strategy. When instead it is likely that principal/supervisor collusion
occurs, the optimal strategy is the stake-eliminating strategy. Notice that the optimal strategy
takes into account the extra cost, w∅ > 0, of the stake-eliminating strategy. Since for this strategy
∂w
∅
∂π < 0, setting w∅ > 0 to reduce sH is proﬁtable when principal/supervisor collusion is likely to
take place (i.e., π relatively large).
When the side transfer technology is not totally eﬃcient (i.e., k < 1), three cases must then be
considered.
If p ≤ 1−k, the probability that supervision will not reveal anything, and thus supervisor/agent
and principal/supervisor collusion will not take place is relatively high. That is, the probability
that w∅ will be paid to the agent is relatively high. The optimal strategy is then the incentive
strategy.
If instead the supervision technology is relatively eﬃcient (i.e., p > 1− k), and it is therefore
likely that supervisor/agent and principal/supervisor collusion will take place, the optimal strategy
will depend on the quality of the production technology. When π ≤ π, that is, when the production
technology is relatively ineﬃcient, the incentive strategy is the optimal strategy. This is because it
is then likely that the agent produces a low output, and thus the principal’s main concern becomes
the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent. When instead the production
technology is relatively eﬃcient, it is likely that the agent produces a high output, and therefore
the principal is mainly concerned with principal/supervisor collusion. The principal then opts for
10
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the stake-eliminating strategy.
When the side transfer technology is totally eﬃcient (i.e., k = 1), deterring principal/supervisor
collusion requires w∅ ≥ wH . Since the objective function is increasing in w∅, it is optimal to set
w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ , or equivalently, to adopt the stake-eliminating strategy.
3.2 S/A collusion allowed and P/S collusion deterred
If the principal decides to allow collusion between the supervisor and the agent in the case where
the supervision reveals evidence that a low output has been produced - that is, if it decides to oﬀer
contracts which do not satisfy the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint sL ≥ s∅ + k(w∅ − wL)
- supervisor/agent collusion takes place. Indeed, as explained above, given that for the bribe
bMS/A ≡ w∅ − wL both the supervisor and the agent are then willing to collude, supervisor/agent
collusion occurs. Consequently, when supervisor/agent collusion is allowed, the supervisor reports
r = ∅ and the principal must then oﬀer w∅ instead of wL to the agent. The agent then pays a
bribe bMS/A ≡ w∅ − wL to the supervisor.
The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is however identical to that in the case where
supervisor/agent collusion is deterred. Indeed, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is now
p
[






S/A)+(1−p)w∅, that is, after substituting
for bMS/A, constraint (1).
As for the principal’s objective function, it writes p [π(wH + sH) + (1− π)(w∅ + s∅)] + (1 −
p)(w∅ + s∅), or equivalently, pπ(wH + sH) + (1− pπ)(w∅ + s∅).
We have made the standard assumption that the supervisor does not engage in collusion when
indiﬀerent. Thus, if the principal decides to allow supervisor/agent collusion, it must set bMS/A ≡
w∅ − wL such that the supervisor receives a strictly positive - and, clearly, as small as possible -
bribe. That is, w∅ − wL ≥ ε, where ε > 0 and ε → 0. The optimal contracts must also satisfy
sL < s∅ + k(w∅ − wL) with k ≤ 1. To obtain a not strict inequality constraint, we rewrite this
11
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constraint as sL ≤ s∅ + k(w∅ − wL − ε). We then have
w∅ − wL ≥ ε. (5)
sL ≤ s∅ + k(w∅ − wL − ε). (6)
Therefore, if the principal allows supervisor/agent collusion, the program of the hierarchical
organization is
[P2] min pπ(wH + sH) + (1− pπ)(w∅ + s∅)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6).
Deﬁne π̂ ≡ 1−kp . Proposition 2 summarizes the solution to this program.
Proposition 2 . A hierarchy where supervisor/agent collusion is allowed and
principal/supervisor collusion is deterred has the following properties:
(1) The optimal contracts are (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, ε,
γ




pπ − ε) for
k < 1, (a) p ≤ 1− k; (b ) p > 1− k and π ≤ π̂. The expected cost of production and supervision
is C1(ε) = γ1−k +
(1−k−pπ)ε
1−k = C
1 + (1−k−pπ)ε1−k .




pπ ), sL ∈
[
0, k( γpπ − ε)
]
and s∅ = sH = 0
for k = 1 and k < 1, p > 1− k and π > π̂. The expected cost of production and supervision is C3.
Before providing intuition for this proposition, note that, since collusion between the supervisor
and the agent is allowed, the incentive strategy adopted here is slightly diﬀerent from that adopted
in the case where both types of collusion are deterred. Also observe that for the parameter values
of case (1) of Proposition 2, one has 1−k−pπ1−k ≥ 0.
Given that π̂ > π when p > 1−k, the stake-eliminating strategy is less often adopted here than
in the case where both types of collusion are deterred. This is because, unlike in the case where
12
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supervisor/agent collusion is prevented, the principal must now also pay a wage w∅ to the agent
when supervision reveals evidence that the agent has produced a low output. In other words, the
stake-eliminating strategy has now an extra cost. Thus, compared with the case where both types
of collusion are prevented, when supervisor/agent collusion is allowed, an incentive strategy has
an additional advantage over the stake-eliminating strategy.
Finally, note that since when adopting the present policy the principal must pay w∅ and s∅
respectively to the agent and the supervisor both when supervision has been inconclusive and when
a low output has been produced, the expected cost of the stake-eliminating strategy is diﬀerent
here from that in the ﬁrst policy where both types of collusion are deterred.
3.3 S/A collusion deterred and P/S collusion allowed
By the same argument as in the previous subsection, if the principal decides to allow collusion be-
tween itself and the supervisor, principal/supervisor collusion occurs. Hence, when the supervision
reveals that the agent has produced a high output and principal/supervisor collusion is allowed,
the supervisor receives a bribe bMP/S ≡ wH+sH−w∅−s∅ from the principal to report r = ∅ instead
of r = xH .
The principal’s objective function becomes p
[
π(w∅ + s∅ + b
M
P/S) + (1− π)(wL + sL)
]
+ (1 −
p)(w∅ + s∅), that is, after substituting for b
M
P/S , the same objective function as that of program
[P1].
The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is now p [πw∅ + (1− π)wL] + (1 − p)w∅ − γ ≥
pwL + (1− p)w∅, or equivalently,




We have assumed that the supervisor does not engage in collusion when indiﬀerent. Hence, if the
principal decides to allow principal/supervisor collusion, it must set bMP/S ≡ wH+sH−w∅−s∅ such
that the supervisor receives a strictly positive - and, obviously, as small as possible - bribe. That
13
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is, wH+sH−w∅−s∅ ≥ ε. The optimal contracts must also satisfy sH < s∅+k(wH+sH−w∅−s∅),
that is, sH < s∅ +
k
1−k (wH − w∅). To obtain a not strict inequality constraint, we rewrite this
constraint as sH ≤ s∅ +
k
1−k (wH − w∅ − ε). We therefore have
wH + sH − w∅ − s∅ ≥ ε. (8)
sH ≤ s∅ +
k
1− k
(wH − w∅ − ε) if k ∈ (0, 1) or wH ≥ w∅ + ε if k = 1. (9)
When the principal allows collusion between itself and the supervisor, the program of the
hierarchy is
[P3] min p [π(wH + sH) + (1− π)(wL + sL)] + (1− p)(w∅ + s∅)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (2), (3), (7), (8), and (9).
The following proposition then summarizes the solution to this program.
Proposition 3 . A hierarchy where supervisor/agent collusion is deterred and
principal/supervisor collusion is allowed has the following properties: the optimal contracts are
such that wL = s∅ = 0, w∅ =
γ
pπ , wH =
γ
pπ + ε, sL =
kγ
pπ and sH = 0 for k ≤ 1. The expected cost
of production and supervision is C2(ε) = [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γpπ + pπε = C
2 + pπε.
Compared with the full preventive policy to cope with collusion, that is, policy 1, deterring
supervisor/agent collusion is now always costly. This is because, when allowing collusion between
the supervisor and itself, the principal systematically sets w∅ =
γ
pπ , and hence sL =
kγ
pπ .
3.4 Both types of collusion allowed
If the principal decides to allow both types of collusion, its objective function becomes
14
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p
[
π(w∅ + s∅ + b
M
P/S) + (1− π)(w∅ + s∅)
]
+ (1− p)(w∅ + s∅), that is, the objective function of
program [P2]. The principal must minimize this function under constraints (2), (6), (7), (8), and
(9). Given that ε < γpπ , constraint (5) is strictly less restrictive than constraint (7), and hence is
redundant.
When both types of collusion are allowed the program of the hierarchy is thus
[P4] min pπ(wH + sH) + (1− pπ)(w∅ + s∅)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (2), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
The solution to this program is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 . A hierarchy where both types of collusion are allowed has the following proper-
ties: the optimal contracts are such that wL = s∅ = 0, w∅ =
γ
pπ , wH =
γ
pπ + ε, sL ∈
[
0, k( γpπ − ε)
]
and sH = 0 for k ≤ 1. The expected cost of production and supervision is C
3(ε) = γpπ + pπε =
C3 + pπε.
We now turn to the determination of the optimal policy to deal with collusion.
4 Optimal information management in firms
To determine the optimal policy to cope with collusion/information concealment in ﬁrms, we
compare the expected costs of the above four policies. These cost comparisons yield:
Theorem. It is not optimal to allow information concealment in hierarchical ﬁrms, or, equiva-
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This theorem establishes a multi-collusion-proofness principle and can be explained in the
following way. We ﬁrst consider the case where k ∈ (0, 1). In this case, policy 3 (preventing
supervisor/agent collusion and allowing principal/supervisor collusion) is strictly less expensive
than policy 4 (allowing both types of collusion). Indeed, the only diﬀerence between these two
policies is that when the supervision reveals that a low output has been produced, the principal pays
sL =
kγ
pπ to the supervisor if it decides to prevent supervisor/agent collusion, whereas if allowing
this type of collusion, the principal pays w∅ =
γ
pπ to the agent. The extra costs of supervisor/agent
collusion deterrence and allowance are then respectively p(1 − π)kγpπ and p(1 − π)
γ
pπ . Since there
are transaction costs connected to side contracting, that is, k ∈ (0, 1), preventing supervisor/agent
collusion is optimal.
Three cases must be distinguished when comparing policy 3 with policy 1 (preventing both
types of collusion). If p > 1 − k and π > π, policy 1 is strictly less expensive since wH is larger
when adopting policy 3. If p ≤ 1− k, the probability that supervision will not be conclusive, and
therefore w∅ will be paid to the agent is relatively high. Allowing principal/supervisor collusion,
and thus setting w∅ =
γ
pπ is then more expensive than deterring both types of collusion through
an incentive strategy with w∅ = 0. If p > 1 − k and π ≤ π, it is likely that a low output will be
produced, and hence sL will be paid to the supervisor. It is then strictly less expensive to prevent
principal/supervisor collusion, and thus set sL = 0, than to allow this type of collusion and set
sL =
kγ
pπ . To sum up policy 1 is strictly preferable to policy 3.
Finally, as above, three cases should be considered when comparing policy 1 with policy 2
(allowing supervisor/agent collusion and preventing principal/supervisor collusion). If p ≤ 1 − k,
or p > 1 − k and π ∈ (0, π], both policies use an incentive strategy to deter principal/supervisor
collusion. However, policy 1 is strictly less expensive than policy 2 given that, as explained, policy




pπ − ε) instead of w∅ = 0 and sH =
kγ
(1−k)pπ . If p > 1 − k and
π ∈ (π, π̂], policy 1 uses a stake-eliminating strategy (i.e., sH = 0) to prevent principal/supervisor
16
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pπ − ε)). In this case, a stake-
eliminating strategy is strictly preferable since it is likely that supervision reveals that a high
output has been produced, and hence sH will be paid to the supervisor. If p > 1− k and π > π̂,
both policies use a stake-eliminating strategy to deter principal/supervisor collusion. Policy 1 is
however strictly less expensive. The reason is that provided above for the comparison of policies 3
and 4.
In the case where k = 1, policies 1 and 2 have the same cost and are less expensive than policies
3 and 4. Policy 1 is therefore weakly optimal.
To summarize the ﬁndings, we have that preventing collusion is strictly preferable in the most
likely case where k < 1 and weakly preferable in the case where k = 1.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the optimal response of a hierarchical agency relationship to the
threat of multiple types of information concealment. Departing from the existing literature, we
have presented a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy vulnerable to supervisor/agent and princi-
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 . Before turning to the derivation of the optimal incentive contracts of
the four policies, it is straightforward to see that, for each policy, the principal optimally sets s∅ as
low as allowed by the limited liability constraint, that is, s∅ = 0. This is because an uninformative
report is undesirable from the principal’s point of view.
By reducing wH the principal may both soften constraints and lower the expected cost of the
hierarchy. We therefore have wH =
γ
pπ + wL from the agent’s binding incentive compatibility
constraint. Two cases must then be distinguished with respect to k.
1. k < 1. The equation wH =
γ
pπ +wL should be substituted into the principal/supervisor no-




pπ +wL−w∅). The principal may relax
this constraint by increasing w∅. However, since setting w∅ >
γ
pπ + wL instead of w∅ ≤
γ
pπ + wL
both increases the expected cost of the hierarchy (because this cost is increasing in w∅) and makes
the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint sL ≥ k(w∅ − wL) more severe without allowing to
reduce sH below 0 (because of the limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0), we have w∅ ≤
γ
pπ + wL.




pπ + wL − w∅), that is, the limited liability
constraint sH ≥ 0 is redundant. A similar argument proves that the relevant constraint on sL
is not the limited liability constraint sL ≥ 0 but the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint
sL ≥ k(w∅ −wL). Indeed, the principal may relax the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint by
increasing wL. However, since setting wL > w∅ instead of wL ≤ w∅ both increases the expected
cost of the hierarchy (because this cost is increasing in wL) and makes the principal/supervisor




pπ +wL−w∅) more severe without allowing to reduce sL below
0 (because of the limited liability constraint sL ≥ 0), we have wL ≤ w∅. To summarize, we have
w∅ ≤
γ






with wL ≥ 0, and thus the relevant




pπ + wL − w∅) and sL ≥ k(w∅ − wL).
Given that the objective function is increasing in sL and sH and lowering these wages does not
18
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pπ + wL − w∅).














Two cases have now to be considered.
Let Γ ≡ (1− k) [1− p [1− (1− π)k]]− pπk. Then if Γ ≥ 0, that is, if π ≤ π ≡ (1−k)[1−p(1−k)]pk(2−k) ,
the objective function is increasing in w∅. It is then optimal to set w∅ as low as possible, that is,
w∅ = wL. Substituting w∅ = wL into the objective function of the above program, this function
writes γ1−k + wL. Since this function is increasing in wL, the principal sets wL as low as possible,
that is, wL = 0, and hence w∅ = 0. We then have wH =
γ
pπ , sL = 0 and sH =
kγ
(1−k)pπ .
If instead Γ < 0, that is, if π > π, the objective function is decreasing in w∅, and it is hence
optimal to set w∅ as high as possible. The principal then sets w∅ =
γ
pπ + wL. Substituting this
equation into the objective function of the above program, this function becomes [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γpπ +
wL. Given that this function is increasing in wL, the principal sets wL as low as possible, that is,
wL = 0, and hence wH = w∅ =
γ
pπ . We then have sL =
kγ
pπ and sH = 0.
Since we have π ≥ 1 if p ≤ 1 − k, and thus we then systematically have Γ ≥ 0, the optimal
contracts are: a. (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ ) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0,
kγ
(1−k)pπ ) for (α) p ≤ 1− k; (β)
p > 1 − k and π ≤ π. The expected cost of the hierarchy is then C1 = γ1−k . b. (wL, w∅, wH) =
(0, γpπ ,
γ
pπ ) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (
kγ
pπ , 0, 0) for p > 1−k and π > π. The expected cost of the hierarchy
is then C2 = [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γpπ .
2. k = 1. Given that the principal’s objective function is increasing in w∅, and lowering
this wage does not make constraints more severe in this case, we optimally have w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ + wL from the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraint and the agent’s binding incentive
compatibility constraint. Substituting w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ + wL both into the objective function of
19
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program [P1] and into the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint, we have:
min [1−p(1−π)]γpπ +wL + p [(1− π)sL + πsH ]
wL, sL, sH
s.t. wL ≥ 0, sL ≥
γ
pπ and sH ≥ 0.
We clearly have wL = 0, sL =
γ
pπ and sH = 0. The expected cost of the hierarchy is then
C3 = γpπ .
Proof of Proposition 2 . Since wL does not enter the objective function and reducing this wage
relaxes the constraint wH − wL ≥
γ
pπ , we have wL = 0. This constraint thus writes wH ≥
γ
pπ .
Given that reducing wH lowers the expected cost of the hierarchy without making constraints more
severe, we have wH =
γ
pπ . Two cases should then be considered with respect to k.
1. k < 1. Substituting wH =
γ
pπ into the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraint, this




pπ − w∅). The principal may then relax this constraint by increasing
w∅. However, since setting w∅ >
γ
pπ instead of w∅ ≤
γ
pπ increases the expected cost of the
hierarchy (because this cost is increasing in w∅) without allowing to reduce sH below 0 (because of
the limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0), we have w∅ ≤
γ





pπ − w∅), that is, the limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0 is redundant. Note that since




. Program [P2] then writes:




















pπ −w∅) into the objective function and expressing the objective function with respect
to w∅, the optimal wage w∅ is thus the solution to
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and sL ∈ [0, k(w∅ − ε)].
Let Φ ≡ 1− k− pπ. Two cases should then be distinguished. If Φ ≥ 0, that is, if π ≤ π̂ ≡ 1−kp ,
the objective function is increasing in w∅ and it is thus optimal to set w∅ = ε. In this case, sL = 0
and the expected cost of the hierarchy is C1(ε) = C1 + (1−k−pπ)ε1−k . If instead Φ < 0, that is, if
π > π̂, the objective function is decreasing with w∅ and it is therefore optimal to set w∅ =
γ
pπ . In
this case, sL ∈
[
0, k( γpπ − ε)
]
and the expected cost of production and supervision is C3 = γpπ .
Since π̂ ≥ 1 if p ≤ 1− k, we have the diﬀerent cases of Proposition 2 for k < 1.
2. k = 1. Since γpπ > ε, constraint w∅ ≥ wH , that is, w∅ ≥
γ
pπ , is more restrictive than
constraint w∅ ≥ ε. Program [P2] thus writes:




pπ , sL ∈ [0, w∅ − ε] and sH ≥ 0.
Given that the objective function of this program is increasing in w∅, w∅ =
γ
pπ (= wH). We
obviously have sL ∈
[
0, γpπ − ε
]
and sH = 0. Hence, when k = 1, the expected cost of production
and supervision is C3.
Proof of Proposition 3 . Since reducing w∅ and sL lowers the expected cost of the hierarchy
without making constraints more severe, we have w∅ =
γ
pπ + wL, and hence sL =
kγ
pπ with k ≤ 1.
We then obviously have wL = 0, and thus w∅ =
γ
pπ and wH +sH ≥
γ
pπ +ε. Program [P3] becomes:
min [1−p[1−(1−π)]k]γpπ + pπ(wH + sH)
wH , sH
s.t. wH + sH ≥
γ




pπ − ε) if k < 1 or wH ≥
γ
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Clearly, we then have wH+sH =
γ
pπ +ε and sH = 0. Therefore, wH =
γ
pπ +ε and the expected
cost of production and supervision is C2(ε) = C2 + pπε.
Proof of Proposition 4 . As above, obviouslywL = 0, and hence w∅ =
γ
pπ and sL ∈
[
0, k( γpπ − ε)
]
for k ≤ 1. Program [P4] then writes:
min (1−pπ)γpπ + pπ(wH + sH)
wH , sH
s.t. wH + sH ≥
γ




pπ − ε) if k < 1 or wH ≥
γ
pπ + ε if
k = 1.
As in the preceding proof, wH + sH =
γ
pπ + ε and sH = 0. Therefore, wH =
γ
pπ + ε and the
expected cost of the hierarchy is C3(ε) = C3 + pπε.
Proof of the Theorem. We start by comparing the various policies in the case where k < 1.
First, let us compare the cost of policy 3, that is, the cost of preventing supervisor/agent collusion
and allowing principal/supervisor collusion, with the cost of policy 4, that is, the cost of allowing
both types of collusion. Since C2 < C3 for k ∈ (0, 1), we clearly have C2(ε) < C3(ε), and hence,
as explained in the text, policy 4 is strictly more expensive than policy 3.
Next, let us compare the cost of policy 3 with the cost of policy 1, that is, the cost of preventing
both types of collusion. As clear from Proposition 1, when p > 1−k and π > π, policy 3 is strictly
more expensive than policy 1. Given that if π ≤ π, C1 ≤ C2, and hence C1 < C2(ε), and recalling
that π ≥ 1 if p ≤ 1− k, we have that when p ≤ 1− k, or p > 1− k and π ≤ π, policy 1 is strictly
less expensive than policy 3. To sum up, policy 1 is strictly preferable to policy 3.
Finally, we must compare the cost of policy 1 with the cost of policy 2, that is, the cost of
allowing supervisor/agent collusion and preventing principal/supervisor collusion. Before proceed-
ing to this comparison, note that π < π̂ if p > 1 − k, and recall that π̂ ≥ 1 if p ≤ 1 − k. When
22
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p ≤ 1 − k, or p > 1 − k and π ∈ (0, π], we must compare C1 (policy 1) with C1(ε) (policy 2).
Given that (1−k−pπ)ε1−k ≥ 0 if π ≤ π̂, and hence C
1 ≤ C1(ε) if π ≤ π̂, the optimal policy is policy
1. When p > 1 − k and π ∈ (π, π̂], we must compare C2 (policy 1) with C1(ε) (policy 2). Since
C1 ≤ C1(ε) if π ≤ π̂ and C2 < C1 if π > π, policy 1 is then optimal. When p > 1− k and π > π̂,
we must compare C2 (policy 1) with C3 (policy 2). Given that C2 < C3, the principal then opts
for policy 1.
As it is straightforward to see, for k = 1 policies 1 and 2 have the same cost and are less
expensive than policies 3 and 4. Deterring all types of collusion is then weakly optimal.
Summarizing these comparisons, we have that deterring both types of collusion is strictly less
expensive than the other three possible policies if k < 1 and weakly less expensive than the other
three policies if k = 1.
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